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Abstract
In this paper I respond to the objections put forth by Kresˇimir
Agbaba (this volume: Kriterion (2009) 22: 1-6) against my ear-
lier paper (Kriterion (2006) 20: 7-13) in which I argue that given
Donnellan’s formulation—as well as Kripke’s and Salmon’s gen-
eralized accounts—an attributive use of a definite description is a
very rare linguistic phenomenon.
In using a definite description a speaker may wish to talk about a par-
ticular object he has in mind, or he may wish to talk about whatever
or whoever fits that description; Donnellan called the former a “referen-
tial” and the latter an “attributive use” [2]. Obviously not every use of
a definite description would fit one or the other category and Donnellan
was the first to admit that the distinction is not supposed to be exhaus-
tive. Clearly there are contexts in which a speaker could use a definite
description neither referentially nor attributively. No author who has
written on the topic has been much bothered by such cases, and the
common tendency in the literature has been to take these as exceptional
uses that do not carry too much theoretical significance. Recently I
argued that this is not the case [4]. I did not make an issue of the ref-
erential use; it seems quite clear to me that we use definite descriptions
referentially quite frequently, and it may well be the case that this is the
most common way of usage; my problem had to do with the so-called
“attributive” use which Donnellan initially described as a use in which
a speaker “wishes to assert something about whatever or whoever fits
that description.” [2, p. 285]. Later Kripke identified this with an in-
tention to refer to the “semantic referent” of the definite description [6,
p. 173-174]. But Donnellan was not too strict about his own criterion,
and did allow for “near miss” cases in which a speaker intends to refer
to an object which does not exactly fit the description, but it is “close
enough” to count as an attributive use. In effect only in the referential
use can one “miss by a mile” according to Donnellan [3, p. 210].
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Now I argued that there are clear cases in which a speaker in using
a definite description may have an intention to talk about something
which he or she does not have in mind in the appropriate sense, thus
ruling out it being a case of a referential use, though the speaker clearly
does not wish to talk about whatever exactly fits the description nor
something close enough to it to make it a near miss [4]. As I argued uses
of definite descriptions are not always this neat, and we speakers may
have a complicated network of intentions concerning the different parts
of a definite description in a particular use of it. To make my point I
specifically concentrated on a use of a complex definite description that
has a very strong attributive flavor, though a part of the description is
being used referentially. Take a complex definite description (i.e. one
that has another singular term embedded in it) in the form “the F which
is the G”, and suppose that a speaker in using the (larger) description
has no specific object in mind, in Donnellan’s sense, ruling out the use
of being referential; but then we may further suppose that the speaker
in using the embedded description “the G” intends to refer to an object,
which he has in mind, and which he takes to be the G, making the use of
the embedded description “the G” by the speaker a referential use. Now
what ought to be said about the speaker’s use of the larger description
“the F which is the G”? Such uses of definite descriptions seem to be
left out of the picture by Donnellan’s [2] own formulation, as well as
Kripke’s [6] and Salmon’s [7] generalized accounts. Though this was my
main focus, I also talked about a couple of other problematic cases.
In a recent objection, Kresˇimir Agbaba [1] argues that the exam-
ples I provide which I claim to be problematic are in fact nothing but
attributive uses of definite descriptions. Let’s look at these cases and
Agbaba’s comments. In one of my examples (which is a modification
of one of Donnellan’s own stories), a man visits a tribe wishing to meet
with someone by referring to him as “the king” who in fact is a usurper.
In this case the speaker does not know who this person is, in the appro-
priate sense, and therefore is not using the term “the king” referentially,
nor does he wish to assert something about the actual king. Though the
use of the description appears to have an attributive flavor to it, quite
clearly the speaker has not merely scored a near miss and is totally off
track. Now curiously enough regarding this case Agbaba says, “I do not
see what would count as a wild miss” [1, p. 3]. If there is an actual
king, and the man the visitor wishes to talk about is in fact a usurper,
then it seems obvious to me that trying to pick him out by the term
“the king” is a wild miss. Surely we could find a uniquely indentify-
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ing attribute that would pick out that man our speaker wishes to meet.
Perhaps, “the usurper whom you guys believe to be your king” would
do the job; but the whole point is that our speaker does not use such
an expression. His words simply do not capture his intent, though they
may enable his audience to pick out the right person in this context. It
is a simple fact that our speaker in using the term “the king” does not
wish to talk about the king, making it impossible to consider it as being
an attributive use.
In another case (which again I derived by modifying and extending
one of Donnellan’s own examples) an investigator uses the definite de-
scription “the gun that killed Smith’s murderer” (when Jones, who was
on trial for murdering Smith, is killed by a gunshot), wishing to assert
something about the gun that killed Jones. Now let’s suppose that Jones
is in fact not Smith’s murderer, but our investigator still wishes to assert
something about the gun that killed Jones. Again here there appears to
be a wild miss, for the actual term that our speaker uses, namely “the
gun that killed Smith’s murderer”, by no means picks out the gun he
wishes to talk about, and it is not even close. Now regarding this case
Agbaba has the following to say:
“The investigator most surely doesn’t refer to a specific gun
he has in mind (it is not in his empirical field), but rather
correlates the gun’s attribute by which Smith’s murderer got
killed. More precisely, the investigator ‘refers’ to the at-
tribute of ‘not being found’. This is clearly asserting some-
thing about whatever fits the description” [1, p. 3].
Fits which description? Surely not: “the gun that killed Smith’s mur-
derer”. Indeed there is another description that would pick out the right
gun, namely “the gun that killed Jones”, but that is not the one that
the speaker used. Agbaba may wish to insist that as long as there is
such a description that picks out the right object, even if it is not the
one that the speaker in fact used, that is good enough to make his use
an attributive one; then I do not see how that will also not be true of the
referential use. For any referential use we could always find a definite
description that semantically picks out the object the speaker wishes to
talk about. For instance if the speaker uses “Smith’s murderer” referen-
tially to refer to a man, we could always substitute “the man I have in
mind whom I take to be Smith’s murderer” to do the job. Is that going
to make the use of “Smith’s murderer” an attributive use? Surely not.
What is quite puzzling for me is that as I understand Agbaba seems
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to think that when we use a definite description attributively we do not
in fact pick out the object in virtue of it fitting the description:
“The definite description in its attributive function is not
structured in the way that it alone points to some definite
object that fits the description – namely, the uttered expres-
sion (containing the description in attributive use), doesn’t
give us the requisite elements for the objects identification.
Therefore, it doesn’t enable the identification, but merely
ascribes a certain attribute” [1, p. 4].
I must admit that if an attributive use is not good for identifying an
object, then I do not see how we can even make sense of Donnellan’s for-
mulation which explicates an attributive use as one in which the speaker
wishes to assert something about what fits the description. Even Rus-
sell himself who held that ordinary definite descriptions are not singular
terms did countenance a certain denotation relation between a definite
description and an object.
Finally my last and perhaps most important point was that when a
speaker uses a definite description referentially to refer to an object he
has in mind, even when that object is the semantic referent of the de-
scription, it still is not the case that the speaker’s primary intention is to
refer to the semantic referent of the description. So the cases that I find
problematic are not cases in which there are wild misses; rather they are
simply ordinary cases which contain no error and, cases in which, to use
Kripke’s terminology, semantic reference and speaker’s reference totally
overlap. So then we come to the result that using a definite description
with the primary intention of referring to the semantic referent is a rare
linguistic phenomenon. This I take to be a claim about the pragmatics
of the use of a definite description, rather than the semantics of what a
definite description expresses or refers to in a sentence.
Let us remember that Kripke [6] accused Donnellan of confusing se-
mantics with pragmatics; he argued that Russell’s theory of descriptions,
or any other semantic theory, attempts to give a semantic analysis of a
sentence. So unless we take the referential/attributive distinction to have
a semantic significance, it has no bearing on Russell’s theory. Given that
the distinction does not amount a semantic ambiguity between a refer-
ential and an attributive use, says Kripke, it cannot be used to refute
any semantic theory. I side with Kripke here, but it appears Agbaba
has not been convinced by Kripke’s argument. That is why, it seems, he
criticizes my view that an attributive use of a definite description is an
extremely rare linguistic phenomenon:
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“Furthermore I must confess that I don’t see why would at-
tributive uses be an “extremely rare linguistic phenomenon”
in our everyday discourse. In a Russellian interpretation
(which acknowledges only attributive uses) definite descrip-
tions play a role of expressing “object-independent proposi-
tions”, unlike proper names that express “object-dependent
propositions” [4]. They are perfectly natural and standard
elements of our language” [1, p. 5].
As I side with Kripke on this issue, and take the referential/attributive
distinction to be predominantly a pragmatic one, I think it would be
a mistake to claim that Russell’s theory gives an account of one and
not the other. Russell’s theory gives a semantic analysis of a definite
description that occurs in a sentence; it has nothing to say about what
intentions the speaker may or may not have in using such an expression
and what effect this has on what he or she may have referred to by
this use. Russell’s theory must remain silent on this issue, for as Kripke
forcibly argued it is not a pragmatic theory about the conditions for a
speaker to refer, but rather it is a theory about the semantic function
definite descriptions play in a sentence.1
My basic point here has to do with pragmatics more than semantics,
which is that it is rarely the primary intention of a speaker to assert some-
thing about the semantic referent of a definite description when used in
an utterance; I am strongly inclined to think that this says something
quite important about our use of language, and I fail to see how any-
thing Agbaba says is incompatible with this basic claim. Furthermore
Donnellan’s referential/attributive distinction should be reformulated to
take this into account, if we wish it to shed light on how we in fact make
use of definite descriptions.2 3
1Though I side with Kripke here, I am not sure whether Russell himself
was that clear on whether he was doing semantics or pragmatics. Given his
epistemology, and especially his theory of acquaintance, which in fact gave
rise to his theory of descriptions, he held many theses which today we would
consider to be in the realm of pragmatics. Nonetheless I still think that his
theory of descriptions is a semantic theory and not a pragmatic one.
2On the other hand it seems to me that a lot of confusion in the literature
has been caused by the fact there is more than one “referential/attributive”
distinction and Donnellan was himself not clear on which one he had intended.
See [5] for a detailed discussion of this.
3I wish to thank the editors of Kriterion and Kresˇimir Agbaba for their
valuable interest in the topic.
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